Jamaica’s UK Reparations Campaign Is Just a Demand for Foreign Aid

Jamaica’s UK Reparations Campaign Is Just a Demand for Foreign Aid

Jamaica’s Reparations Campaign is a Waste of a Good Government

Jamaica has pulled off one of the developing world’s most impressive financial turnarounds. So why is its Government focusing on reparations claims instead of telling that success story to the world? asks Lipton Matthews.

LIPTON MATTHEWS

In September, a Jamaican delegation will travel to Britain to place a petition in the hands of King Charles III. The request is quite specific: that the King, in his capacity as Jamaica’s head of state, refer three questions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on whether the transatlantic slave trade was unlawful, whether it amounted to a crime against humanity and whether Britain owes a remedy for it. The petition is the work of Jamaica’s National Council on Reparations, and is taken seriously by the Jamaican Government. Reparations has been formal government policy in Jamaica for over a decade, coordinated through a standing national commission and backed by the wider CARICOM Reparations Commission, which published an updated reparations manifesto earlier this year. The Culture Minister has called it a new legal phase of a campaign that enhances the work of Caricom.

In reality, however, it is a demand for foreign aid. Strip away the moral language and the mechanism is the same as any transfer scheme: a claim on another country’s treasury, justified by past injustice rather than present productivity, disbursed without any requirement that the receiving state alter the domestic conditions that limit its own growth. Jamaica does not need to relitigate the ethics of slavery to see the economic problem here. Six decades of development economics have already run this experiment. Aid transfers, even large ones, have a dismal record of converting into sustained growth in the recipient country, because money alone does not build the institutions, skills or infrastructure that make capital productive.

The contrast with East Asia is instructive precisely because those countries were considered to be economic backwaters in the 1960s. What separated South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore was not the scale of external transfers they received. It was technology transfer, pursued deliberately and bidirectionally. Governments sent bureaucrats and engineers abroad to study Western industrial and administrative practice and brought firms into licensing and joint-venture arrangements that facilitated the absorption of foreign know-how. Private firms did the same on their own initiative, sending managers to Western factories, reverse-engineering machinery, and building corporate structures modelled on the firms they were competing against. East Asians did not simply wait for capital to arrive. They worked with foreign experts to build absorptive capacity. That is the difference between an inflow of money and an inflow of the capacity to use money productively, and it is the difference reparations proponents consistently skip over.

Jamaica has direct experience of what happens when capital arrives without that absorptive capacity. For years the country ran into the paradox of high foreign direct investment alongside low growth. Money came in, but growth stayed flat, because it ran into a wall of binding constraints: inadequate infrastructure, a weak energy grid, low levels of human capital, bureaucratic friction and a business environment that made it hard for capital to translate into productivity. The lesson is not that Jamaica needs more capital. It is that Jamaica needs to fix the constraints that keep existing and incoming capital from compounding. A reparations payment, even a large one, walks into the same wall. It does not build a port, train an engineer or rewire a grid on its own; it merely repeats the FDI paradox at a different scale and with worse incentives, since aid dependent on grievance narratives has even weaker accountability mechanisms than commercial investment does.

What makes the reparations push especially wasteful is that Jamaica is sitting on a genuinely good story it is failing to sell. Its IMF-supported reform programme has been one of the more credible fiscal turnarounds in the developing world. The IMF’s own assessments describe a decade of falling public debt, anchored inflation, record-low unemployment and a financial system that has weathered repeated shocks, including hurricanes, without losing credibility. This performance was significant enough that the Financial Times ran a glowing account of Jamaica’s transformation, describing it as a genuine economic renaissance built on debt reduction and macroeconomic discipline. Public debt is on a credible path approaching below 60% of GDP, a level most G7 finance ministries would envy.

This is the asset Jamaica should be exporting, not petitions. The Prime Minister ought to be on stages at the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies, laying out for a British audience of all places what a small, historically over-indebted state did to bring its fiscal house into order. Britain’s own debt load has been drifting upward for years, and a country lecturing London on fiscal discipline while London’s own debt-to-GDP ratio climbs would be a far more interesting message than another round of Privy Council petitions.

It would also do more for Jamaica’s investment brand than any reparations settlement ever could. Sovereign credibility is difficult to build and easy to squander, and Jamaica has built more of it than it currently knows what to do with. Rebranding the country as a serious, rule-following investment destination, on the back of a fiscal record the IMF and the FT are both willing to praise, is the kind of soft power Jamaica should be maximising. Instead, the Government is spending its diplomatic energy performing grievances for a domestic and Caribbean audience while the real asset – its credibility with international capital markets – goes unmarketed.

None of this is a case against Andrew Holness’s Government, which has not governed badly. The debt numbers are real, the macroeconomic stability is real and the reform programme is a genuine institutional achievement. But governing well also means recognising opportunity cost. Every hour a minister spends drafting reparations manifestos, every diplomatic favour spent lining up CARICOM support for a Privy Council reference, is an hour not spent on the two things that would actually move Jamaica’s growth rate: bringing down the cost of energy, which remains one of the most binding constraints on Jamaican competitiveness, and building an international business court that could let Jamaica compete with London and Singapore as a seat for international business litigation.

Both projects would use the country’s hard-won credibility to compound future growth. Reparations diplomacy, by contrast, is a claim on the past that consumes present-day state capacity for a payoff that, even in the best case, would arrive as an unconditional transfer into the same absorptive-capacity constraints that already blunt Jamaica’s FDI. Jamaica has spent a decade learning the discipline of not asking for money it hasn’t earned the capacity to use. It would be a strange time to forget that lesson.

Lipton Matthews is a researcher and podcaster. He has worked in the heritage, cultural and sales sectors. His work has been featured in CapX, the Critic, the FederalistEpoch Times and other publications. He is the author of the book Busting African Delusions.


See Related Article Below

They Told You a Story

1807

PROUDOFUS


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They told you colonisers, slavers, oppressors, and that you should feel ashamed of what you are. This is what happens when you test that story against the record.”

.The Full Story

They told you a story about who you are. Colonisers. Slavers. Oppressors. You were meant to feel ashamed, not for anything you did, for what you are.

This film does not argue with that story. It tests it. Britain wrote everything down, so we open the books.

Who were your ancestors, while all this was done in their name? In 1807, fewer than 1 man in 10 could vote. No woman could. They could hang for stealing a sheep, or be shipped abroad for petty theft, as 160,000 were, their children down the mines at 8 and in the mills before dawn. In Manchester, the average age of death in a labouring family was 17. Your ancestors were not exploiting the world. They were underneath it.

That is what makes what happened next extraordinary. When word reached them of what slavery actually was, 800,000 people in chains under their own flag, they went to war with it, with no vote, no army, no seat in Parliament.

A courtroom. In 1772, an enslaved man named James Somerset was carried to London in chains, and an English court ruled English law could not hold a slave. He walked free.

A kitchen. In 1791, 300,000 families stopped buying slave sugar.

A signature. In 1792, 519 petitions carrying 390,000 names hit Parliament, most from people with no vote.

In 1807, Britain banned the slave trade. When the slave owners demanded a price for the 800,000 people they still held, ordinary taxpayers paid it: £20 million, around 40 percent of the annual budget, a debt the Treasury says was not cleared until 2015. Britain recorded every claim, 46,000 of them. Your ancestors are not on that list. They are on the other side of the ledger.

From 1808, the Royal Navy kept a squadron off West Africa with one order: stop the trade. Over 60 years it stopped 1,600 slave ships and freed 150,000 people at sea, costing around 1,600 sailors, most lost to disease, buried 4,000 miles from home. In 1816 it ended the Barbary corsair trade at Algiers, later burning slave ships in Brazil and removing a slaving king in Lagos. In 1896 came the last act: a war in Zanzibar lasting 38 minutes, slavery there abolished by decree within the year.

Almost every nation on earth now outlaws slavery, a fight built largely at British expense, by British hands, people who never owned anyone.

So why have you never heard this? Within living memory the story was rewritten. The trade stayed in the textbooks, as it should. The war against it was cut.

The powerful exploited the world. They exploited their own people first. And it was those people who ended slavery.

Why This Matters

This film exists to correct a specific imbalance. British schools teach the slave trade, and they should. They rarely teach what ordinary British people, without a vote, a seat in Parliament or an army, did about it: the courtroom stand, the sugar boycott, the petitions, the taxes paid for generations, the sailors buried thousands of miles from home. The powerful exploited the world, and they exploited their own people first. It was those people, standing alongside the colonised and the enslaved rather than above them, who spent a lifetime and a fortune ending it. Pride in that record is not empire flattery and it is not flag waving. It is simply the other half of a story this country has only ever told half of.

Key Facts

  • On 22 June 1772, in the case of James Somerset, the Court of King’s Bench ruled that English law could not support the forcible removal of an enslaved person from England (Wikipedia: Somerset v Stewart)
  • The Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 freed around 800,000 enslaved people across the British colonies and, in the same act, compensated their former owners rather than the people who had been enslaved (UCL; The National Archives)
  • Compensation claims from the 1833 Act totalled around £20 million, then about 40 percent of the government’s annual expenditure, and the residue of the debt raised to pay it was not cleared until 2015 (The National Archives; Full Fact)
  • The 1833 compensation claims, numbering around 46,000, are recorded and searchable through UCL’s Legacies of British Slave-ownership database (UCL)
  • The Royal Navy’s West Africa Squadron, formed after the Slave Trade Act 1807, patrolled from 1808 and captured around 1,600 slave ships, freeing about 150,000 people over its operation (Wikipedia: West Africa Squadron)
  • Royal Navy suppression of the slave trade came at a human cost to its own sailors, with well over a thousand men lost to disease and combat during the West Africa Squadron’s decades of patrols (Wikipedia: West Africa Squadron)

Primary Sources

The 1833 Abolition of Slavery Act and compensation claims

The National Archives

View source →

This is what we know about the government loan to pay slave owners compensation after slavery was abolished in 1833

Full Fact

View source →

SOURCE: ProudOfUs

TLB%20Radio%20Network%207 Jamaica’s UK Reparations Campaign Is Just a Demand for Foreign Aid

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