Converseer

Author: Andrew Korybko

  • Political implications of Poland explicitly planning to profit from Ukraine

    Political implications of Poland explicitly planning to profit from Ukraine

    Poland is finally joining in the scramble for Ukraine after naively sitting on the sidelines all these years.

    Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was surprisingly candid earlier this month when talking about how Poland plans to profit from Ukraine. In his words, “We will help [Ukraine] – Poland is in solidarity, we are a symbol of solidarity – but never again in a naive way. It won’t be the case that Poland will express solidarity while others profit, for example, on the reconstruction of Ukraine. We will be in solidarity and we will make money on it.” There are important political implications to what he said.

    For starters, he’s indirectly lending credence to what outgoing President Andrzej Duda revealed last spring about how foreign companies had already obtained ownership over most of Ukraine’s industrial agriculture. Poland missed the opportunity to participate in the scramble for Ukrainian agriculture due to its naivete in refusing to attach strings to the aid that it donated, which ultimately amounted to more tanks, IFVs, and planes than any other country according to Duda’s official website.

    Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz admitted last summer that Poland had by that point maxed out its military support for Ukraine, which preceded Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski proposing that Ukraine could order more military equipment on credit. One way in which bankrupt Ukraine could pay Poland back might be by leasing land and ports to it, which Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michal Kolodziejczak recently suggested, but for free or at a heavy discount in exchange for canceling its debt.

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    Just like the latest version of Trump’s mineral deal with Ukraine retroactively counts all donated aid as a loan, so too might Poland consider employing the same tactic in an attempt to make up for its previously mentioned lost opportunity in the scramble for Ukrainian agriculture. That could further worsen already difficult political ties between them caused by the revived Volhynia Genocide dispute, however, but Poland’s ace up its sleeve is that it’s the EU’s and Ukraine’s geo-economic gateway to one another.

    If the political will exists, then Poland could complicate their trade across its territory as leverage to this end, including via creative means for plausible deniability purposes like encouraging farmers to once again blockade the border. Poland’s surging exports to Ukraine would be temporarily scaled back, but the greater goal of leasing land and ports there for maximizing profits could be advanced, which would also help Poland in its competition with France and Germany for leadership of post-conflict Europe.

    Poland’s Ukraine Reconstruction Service, which readers can learn more about here, could then function more effectively after Polish companies obtain access to the land and ports that Kolodziejczak suggested. This would also enable Poland and Ukraine to speedily implement their economic cooperation goals that were agreed to in last summer’s security pact. Even if Poland acquires more tangible economic stakes and influence in Ukraine, however, it’s unlikely to dispatch peacekeepers or try to revise the border.

    The first scenario could result in Poland doing the heavy lifting while its European competitors profit at its expense once again while the second would entail enormous economic, political, and security costs that could also backfire by leading to the total loss of Polish influence in Ukraine. Circling back to what Tusk candidly declared last week, profit considerations will shape Poland’s approach towards Ukraine going forward, not naïve solidarity where it continues sacrificing so much in exchange for nothing at all.

  • European Parliament Confirms Poland’s Centrality in Bloc’s Eastern Security Strategy

    European Parliament Confirms Poland’s Centrality in Bloc’s Eastern Security Strategy

    Poland is at a geostrategic crossroads amidst the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” whereby it can either remain a stalwart American ally despite its misgivings about the rapid Russian-US rapprochement, rely more on France to balance the US or pivot away from the US towards France.

    Most observers missed last week’s European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence despite its importance. Article 15 “stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East”, both of which are tied to Poland. In contrast, other articles loosen financial restrictions for investing in defence. Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz praised the resolution on both counts.

    For those who aren’t aware, Poland’s East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line are complementary projects that aim to build a series of high-tech fortifications along these four countries’ shared borders with Russia and Belarus, hence why some consider them to be a single megaproject. Finland’s related border defence plans are oftentimes grouped with them to expand its sense of scale as running from the Arctic to Central Europe. Here are four background briefings to bring readers up to speed:

    * 22 January 2024: “The ‘Baltic Defense Line’ Is Meant To Accelerate The German-Led ‘Military Schengen’”

    * 13 May 2024: “Poland’s Border Fortification Buildup Has Nothing To Do With Legitimate Threat Perceptions”

    * 25 May 2024: “A New Iron Curtain Is Being Built From The Arctic To Central Europe”

    * 28 June 2024: “The ‘EU Defense Line’ Is The Latest Euphemism For The New Iron Curtain”

    Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk foresaw last week’s resolution earlier in the month when he declared that “The Shield East, which is not solely a Polish project after Finnish and Baltic involvement in it, as well the EU’s eastern border, has become a priority and are no more questioned.” This came just several days after European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen unveiled the bloc’s “ReArm Europe Plan”, part of which includes offering members €150 billion worth of loans for defence investments.

    It was with all this in mind that Tusk said the day after the resolution’s passing following his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara that responsibility for Poland’s eastern border plans should be shared by the EU and NATO. He also suggested that they consider this border to be a “common” one in order for it to then be “easier for us to finance and organize this” initiative. Tusk’s de facto request for more European financing and foreign troops was made in the context explained below:

    * 19 February 2025: “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”

    * 6 March 2025: “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”

    * 14 March 2025: “France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland”

    * 15 March 2025: “Poland’s Talk About Obtaining Nukes Is Likely A Misguided Negotiation Tactic With The US”

    Poland is at a geostrategic crossroads amidst the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” whereby it can either remain a stalwart American ally despite its misgivings about the rapid Russian-US rapprochement, rely more on France to balance the US, or pivot away from the US towards France. The outcome of May’s presidential election will likely determine which way it goes since a conservative or populist victory would raise the odds of the first or second scenarios while a liberal-globalist one would raise the third.

    Tusk is essentially seeking to secure more European financing and foreign troops before the elections so as to ensure that the next president feels pressured by precedent into relying more on France to balance the US than remaining a stalwart American ally if they’re not from his party. From the conservative and populist perspectives, it’s a net positive to have more stakeholders in Polish security as long as Poland doesn’t have to cede any more of its sovereignty, so they might appreciate what Tusk has achieved.

  • What Comes Next After The Jaffar Express Terrorist Attack In Pakistan?

    What Comes Next After The Jaffar Express Terrorist Attack In Pakistan?

    Regardless of whether or not Pakistan authorizes kinetic action against “Balochistan Liberation Army” camps in Afghanistan, the state must adequately address the indigenous causes of this conflict without further delay otherwise it’ll never stand any chance of restoring stability to its largest region.

    Pakistan is reeling after this week’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the terrorist-designated “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA). It’s impossible to independently confirm the details given strict state censorship, but around 400 people were taken hostage, including servicemen traveling home on leave. The BLA demanded the release of what they described as political prisoners, but the military staged a daring operation to end the day-long ordeal instead. At least two dozen people were killed.

    The Baloch Conflict owes its origins to Balochistan’s contentious incorporation into Pakistan but has evolved in recent years to take on shades of “resource nationalism”. What’s meant by this is that some locals believe that their resource-rich region, the largest in Pakistan at nearly half the country’s size, isn’t receiving its fair share of wealth. The BLA and its supporters also accuse Pakistan of selling the region out to China. Pakistan denies these claims and has always blamed Afghanistan and India for the conflict.

    It therefore wasn’t surprising when the Foreign Office’s spokesman said on Thursday that “India has been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. In the particular attack on Jaffar express, the terrorists had been in contact with their handlers and ring leaders in Afghanistan.” While the Afghan dimension is likely true owing to the Taliban sheltering the BLA and its new de facto TTP allies, which the group considers to be a means of asymmetrically restoring the balance of power with Pakistan, the Indian angle is questionable.

    Pakistan’s accusation against India is premised on their history of proxy warfare against one another over the decades, which makes it reasonable to suspect India of backing Baloch militants against Pakistan as response to Pakistan backing Kashmiri ones against India, among others. There’s also Pakistan’s capture of Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016, who Islamabad accused of being an Indian spy tasked with organizing terrorist attacks in Balochistan, while India has always insisted that he’s innocent of these charges.

    Taken together, they form the cornerstone upon which the Foreign Office put forth its latest accusation, but it’s bereft of proof and instead comes off as a deflection from the conflict’s indigenous causes and the Taliban’s indisputably more direct role in what happened. After all, the BLA receives sanctuary in Afghanistan, so the Taliban is much more to blame for what happened. Even if the Taliban pleads ignorance and claims that it can’t control its borders, which isn’t true, then that’s also a problem.

    Whichever way one looks at it, the Indian angle is therefore questionable, but Pakistan pushing it is meant to accomplish three goals. First, it’s intended to rally Pakistanis behind the government by blaming their historical rival for this latest terrorist attack. Second, Pakistan also hopes to rally the international community – or at least some of its SCO partners like China – against India. And finally, Pakistan might authorize kinetic action in Afghanistan, but on what it’ll present as an anti-Indian basis.

    Building upon the last point, this could resemble Russia’s special operation in the sense of how Russia militarily intervened in Ukraine on an anti-NATO basis after accusing the bloc of exploiting Ukraine as a proxy, which Russia claimed could become a launching pad for more aggression if it wasn’t stopped. Likewise, Pakistan might carry out comparatively smaller-scale strikes and/or incursions in Afghanistan and only target terrorist groups, but it could justify them on similar grounds.

    The benefit in presenting things this way is that Pakistan can continue to claim that it has no problem with Afghanistan per se, just with how its historical Indian rival is allegedly exploiting that country as a proxy, which could become a launching pad for more aggression if it isn’t stopped. The problem though is that this motive is much more questionable than Russia’s vis-à-vis NATO in its own special operation in Ukraine so Afghans as a whole might regard any larger-scale Pakistani kinetic action as a hostile act.

    Even if Pakistan eschews such a response to this latest terrorist attack for whatever reason, officially tying India into what happened suggests that it has no interest in addressing the conflict’s indigenous causes, instead preferring to blame everything on its neighbor like always. That’ll only lead to an even wider rift emerging between Baloches and the rest of the country, which can in turn result in more BLA sympathizers or even recruits, thus intensifying the already self-sustaining cycle of instability there.

    The larger that the BLA’s pool of sympathizers and recruits becomes, the greater the unconventional threat that Pakistan faces in Balochistan, which could embolden the military regime into doubling down on its controversial “preemptive” anti-terrorist policies like “forced disappearances”. The most effective way to reduce the aforesaid pool is to empower responsible locals through meaningful economic and political partnerships with the state for showing them that they have more to gain through unity.

    For example, Baloch veterans could be appointed to lead new projects in their home region, and these would be obligated to reinvest a percentage of their proceeds into local initiatives. These same figures and other similarly trusted ones could also be supported by the state as alternative community leaders for counteracting the pernicious influence of separatist-inclined tribal leaders. That’s easier said than done, but it should be attempted without delay otherwise the BLA’s pool will keep growing.

    The combination of political radicalism and state failure is most responsible for perpetuating the Baloch Conflict, not foreign forces, though the Taliban’s recent assistance has definitely been important. Without adequately addressing these indigenous causes, which requires a complete thinking on the part of the Pakistani government, outsiders will always be able to exploit this conflict. Accordingly, cross-border kinetic action in Afghanistan can be helpful, but a lasting solution requires much more than that.

  • Russian Spies Warn UK Trying to Sabotage Trump’s Envisaged ‘New Détente’

    Russian Spies Warn UK Trying to Sabotage Trump’s Envisaged ‘New Détente’

    Donald Trump 2.0 must become aware of the threat that the UK poses to its plans and respond accordingly to defend the US’ interests.

    Russia’s Foreign Spy Service (SVR) accused the UK of trying to sabotage the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” for self-interested geopolitical reasons. According to their sources, the success of their talks could break the Brits’ regional containment of Russia, which is why they’re employing a dual-track policy for preventing this. The first part involves information warfare fearmongering about Trump’s ties with Russia while the second seeks to escalate the Ukrainian Conflict through a conventional intervention.

    SVR’s report lacks any bombshells since everything that they revealed was already self-evident to astute observers, but it’s still important that they lent credence to what others before them had already picked up on and the timing with which they did so. “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe” while the UK plans to divide-and-rule the continent like usual, to which end it’s expected to rely more on Poland and/or Ukraine with whom it’s been colluding since February 2022.

    Few either saw it at the time or still remember, but the UK forged an informal trilateral alliance with Poland and Ukraine exactly one week before the special operation began, which was leveraged shortly after to convince Zelensky to abandon spring 2022’s peace talks with Russia as was explained here. In the three years since, Poland and the US have taken harder stances towards Ukraine, the first initially for domestic political reasons and the second due to Trump’s eagerness to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto.

    The aforesaid developments have left the UK as Ukraine’s top supporter, the position of which it expects to maintain for as long as possible since that former Soviet Republic is the lynchpin in London’s regional anti-Russian containment strategy, but events might ultimately force it to abandon this project. Until that happens, however, the UK is doing its utmost within all realistic limits to complicate and even possibly sabotage the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” and associated deal over Ukraine.

    Should it fail, which is seemingly inevitable, then the fallback plan could be to refocus on Poland as the core of a new regional containment coalition that’ll be smaller in scope but nonetheless still formidable. Poland has the largest economy of the EU’s eastern members, now boasts NATO’s third-largest army, and aspires to restore its lost “sphere of influence” at the expense of Russia’s security interests. These factors could converge to make Poland the UK’s preferred top partner in post-conflict Europe.

    The only problem to these plans is that the US is poised to make Poland its own top partner on the continent so the UK might have to compete with its American ally or accept junior partner status vis-à-vis Washington in any trilateral that might form between them. At the same time, however, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski is a diehard Anglophile who even had British citizenship till he gave it up in 2006 to join the government so he might operate as the UK’s “agent of influence” to advance its agenda.

    From the UK’s perspective, the best-case scenario is that: the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” fails for whatever reason; the US then feels compelled to resume large-scale military support to Ukraine in response so as to teach Russia a lesson as Trump might see it; but the UK successfully manipulates Western public opinion to supplant the US as the “leader of the free world” due to its consistently anti-Russian position that never once wavered no matter how difficult things became for Ukraine in the past.

    On the flipside, the worst-case scenario from the UK’s perspective is that: the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” succeeds; a pragmatic compromise follows in Ukraine which turns it into an informal joint protectorate between Russia and the US; the US then turns Poland into its top partner in post-conflict Europe; and the US, not the UK, guides Poland as it restores part of its lost “sphere of influence” and then uses this geopolitical network to divide-and-rule Europe by keeping Germany and Russia apart.

    It’s precisely this sequence of events that’s presently unfolding and which might consequently provoke the UK into doing something very dramatic to sabotage this process out of desperation. Russia clearly has an interest in preventing that, ergo why SVR chose this moment to lend credence to what others before them had already picked up on about the UK’s interests in this context. Trump 2.0 must become aware of the threat that the UK poses to its plans and respond accordingly to defend the US’ interests.

  • Analyzing Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia

    Analyzing Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia

    • The problem appears to be that there isn’t yet enough trust between Russia and the US to fully overcome their security dilemma in spite of the impressive progress that’s been made thus far.

    Donald Trump surprised friends and foes alike when he posted the following on Friday: “Based on the fact that Russia is absolutely ‘pounding’ Ukraine on the battlefield right now, I am strongly considering large scale Banking Sanctions, Sanctions, and Tariffs on Russia until a Cease Fire and FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ON PEACE IS REACHED. To Russia and Ukraine, get to the table right now, before it is too late. Thank you.” Few understood how more sanctions could coerce Russia into a ceasefire.

    Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg shed more light on this approach in early February when he floated the possibility of much stricter secondary sanctions enforcement. This analysis here at the time assessed that India might then slash its Russian oil imports, thus making Russia more dependent on China for foreign revenue for funding its special operation. If Putin doesn’t agree to a ceasefire, the thinking goes, then Russia would risk becoming China’s junior partner.

    India already reduced its import of Russian oil last month to a two-year low ahead of the last Biden-era sanctions entering into effect so the aforesaid scenario isn’t implausible. At the same time, however, India clinched an historic 10-year oil deal with Russia last December and might therefore defy any strict secondary sanctions enforcement at the cost of its ties with the US. Its motive wouldn’t be anti-American, but to prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner at the expense of India’s security.

    India is still largely dependent on Russian military-technical equipment, including spares, and it correspondingly fears that a China-indebted Russia might one day be pressured by Beijing into curtailing and ultimately cutting off this trade in order to give China an edge in their border disputes. Moreover, India might feel compelled by circumstances into becoming the US’ junior partner out of desperation to balance China’s newfound edge in that event, thus ceding its hard-earned strategic autonomy.

    It’s for these reasons why it can’t be taken for granted that India would comply with any potentially strict secondary sanctions enforcement by the US like Trump might be implying, but in any case, none of this explains why he’d hint at this course of action amidst the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”. The immediate context is that he just cut off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine in an attempt to coerce Zelensky into a ceasefire, which was then followed by Russia carrying out large-scale strikes in Ukraine.

    This sequence led to uncomfortable optics even though it was entirely predictable. Some commentators claimed that this is proof that Russia isn’t interested in compromising on its maximum goals in the conflict, thus discrediting Trump’s peace push, and even going as far as to speculate that he might have cut a secret deal with Putin to give the latter more of the land that he claims as his own without having yet extracted any tangible compromises from Russia in return. This might have triggered Trump’s threat.

    If that’s the case, then it would mean that there was either a misunderstanding between Trump and Putin after last month’s call or Putin is unilaterally pressing his advantage in pursuit of better ceasefire terms, either of which could bode ill for their “New Détente” if such trends continue. To be clear, Russia has the right to employ whatever means it deems necessary in advance of its national interests, but this could still inadvertently jeopardize the incipient peace process at this crucial moment.

    In defense of Russia’s strikes, they might have been meant to facilitate its counteroffensive in Kursk ahead of agreeing to a ceasefire once that universally recognized Russian region is liberated and/or defying France’s proposed aerial ceasefire and the UK-led initiative for imposing a partial no-fly zone. In other words, it’s possible that they weren’t connected to Trump cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine but were intended to deter France and the UK from conventionally intervening in Ukraine.

    On that topic, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared early last month that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to NATO countries’ troops in Ukraine so they’re unlikely to risk being hung out to dry, thus suggesting that France and the UK’s latest rhetoric is more about political messaging. “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”, while the UK plans to divide-and-rule its continental peers like always, with each considering this rhetoric a means to that end.

    Nevertheless, Russia likely still felt like it had to signal that it wasn’t deterred by their words otherwise it would look weak, which could explain the primary motivation behind its latest large-scale strikes that coincidentally followed Trump’s unexpected decision to cut military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. Even so, from Trump’s perspective, what Russia just did was probably interpreted by him as a response to his aforesaid move and therefore possibly even an affront sorts to his noble efforts to broker a peace deal.

    The consequent pressure that he came under after Russia’s latest large-scale strikes, which were arguably carried out as a response to France and the UK more so than opportunistically exploiting Ukraine’s newly difficult situation, most convincingly accounts for Trump’s threatening post. From this insight, it can be intuited that he wanted to convey to Russia that strict secondary sanctions enforcement is in the cards if Putin doesn’t compromise on his maximum goals by agreeing to a ceasefire.

    Although it would be a risky move as earlier explained with regard to the possibility of India defying US pressure and thus ruining their relations, Trump might be wagering that Putin would prefer to compromise on Ukraine than make Russia even more dependent on China. Going through with such strict secondary sanctions enforcement could also relieve some pressure upon Trump if he frames it as the Russian equivalent of what he’s already done for coercing Ukraine into a ceasefire.

    The US can’t cut off Russia’s arms or intelligence like it already did Ukraine’s, but it can create the conditions where a large chunk of the foreign financing upon which Russia partially depends for funding its special operation might be cut off if India complies, thus risking more Russian dependence on China. The US doesn’t want Russia more dependent on China, however, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly declared in a recent interview that this wouldn’t be in their country’s best interests.

    It can therefore be concluded that Trump truly expects that his post will have an effect on influencing Putin’s behavior. The best-case scenario from his perspective is that it leads to Putin eschewing more large-scale strikes in Ukraine and then agreeing to a ceasefire after Zelensky is first coerced into this like Trump unsuccessfully sought to do at the White House, while the worst-case one is that Putin is coerced into a ceasefire shortly after the US strictly enforces secondary sanctions against India in pursuit of this.

    Trump doesn’t expect that Putin will defy him in both scenarios since he calculates that Putin doesn’t want Russia to become China’s junior partner like might inevitably happen if the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” collapses and India then capitulates to renewed US sanctions pressure to dump Russia. Be that as it may, Trump is also reluctant to go through with what he implied because there’s always the chance that it backfires by either ruining relations with India or turning Russia into China’s junior partner.

    The problem appears to be that there isn’t yet enough trust between Russia and the US to fully overcome their security dilemma in spite of the impressive progress that’s been made thus far. That’s why Russia likely carried out its large-scale strikes in Ukraine in response to France and the UK’s latest rhetoric, which coincide with the US cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine, and then Trump made his threatening post. Another Putin-Trump call might therefore be necessary in the near future.

    They need to ensure that they’re on the same page with everything after Zelensky’s scandal at the White House abruptly offset the peace trajectory and then the Europeans began openly plotting to sabotage the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” by flirting with a conventional intervention in Ukraine. Trump’s post came as a surprise for all sides and suggested some displeasure with Russia in spite of his public reassurances that peace talks are progressing and that Ukraine, not Russia, is the bigger obstacle.

    There’s always the chance that Trump’s latest sanctions threat wasn’t serious and was only meant to deflect from the pressure that he’s come under after Russia’s latest large-scale strikes created uncomfortable optics in the aftermath of him cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. That said, it would be a mistake not to entertain the possibility that there’s more to it, but Russia and the US’ statements and actions in the coming week will provide more clarity on whether that’s really the case.

  • US Govt’s Reportedly Shifting Rhetoric Towards Russia-Ukraine is Significant

    US Govt’s Reportedly Shifting Rhetoric Towards Russia-Ukraine is Significant

    The US could move its nascent “New Détente” with Russia further along by either forcing the G7 and UNGA Resolution sponsors to change their language about “Russian aggression” or refusing to attach its name to their respective documents on the third anniversary of the special operation if they don’t.

    The Financial Times and Reuters reported that the US Government (USG) respectively refuses to endorse a joint statement from the G7 and a proposed UNGA Resolution that includes the phrase “Russian aggression”, instead allegedly proposing more neutral language like the “Ukrainian Conflict”. That would be extremely significant if true since the US wields more political influence across the world than any other country and can therefore herald a sea change in official global opinion by shifting its rhetoric.

    These reports might very well be true considering how rapidly the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” is progressing. Their leaders’ first conversation since Trump’s return to office was quickly followed by their representatives meeting in Riyadh to discuss the restoration of bilateral ties and a political resolution to the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine. Putin and Trump also plan to meet in the coming weeks. It thus wouldn’t be surprising if the US was softening its language on the conflict as ties with Russia improve.

    After all, they pledged to address the root issues at the core of their proxy war, and the language that Trump used in his social media post lambasting Zelensky last week suggests that he truly understands that attributing everything to so-called “Russian aggression” is grossly inaccurate. To remind the reader, he accused Zelensky of “talk[ing] the United States of America into spending $350 Billion Dollars, to go into a War that couldn’t be won, that never had to start”, which confirms the aforesaid observation.

    For these reasons, it would contradict the USG’s evolving perception of this proxy war as personally pioneered by Trump for his officials to endorse anything that lends false credence to the prior administration’s discredited portrayal of this conflict, hence why the latest reports might be true. In that case, some other countries might follow its lead in order to not get on Trump’s bad side, and this could widen the transatlantic rift between the US and the warmongering EU if the latter clings to their rhetoric.

    For example, Japan might support the US’ reported position towards the G7’s joint statement to ensure backing for its regional plans vis-à-vis China, while a slew of Global South states might abstain from the UNGA vote in order for Trump not to lump them together with the Europeans with all that might entail. The first could split the G7, perhaps irreparably if the Europeans (including culturally similar Canadians) don’t relent, while the second could reinforce the perception of European isolation on the world stage.

    Of course, all of this is dependent on the USG declining to endorse any documents that push the false claim of “Russian aggression” being the source of this conflict, the decision of which it’ll have to make in a few days’ time. If the USG either forces the G7 and UNGA Resolution sponsors to change their documents’ language or doesn’t attach its name to them if they refuse, then it would move the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” further along and speed up the timeframe for the Putin-Trump Summit.

  • The Example That Trump Made Out Of Colombia Will Reverberate Across The World

    The Example That Trump Made Out Of Colombia Will Reverberate Across The World

    Trump is preparing for negotiations with Putin over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence.

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro thought that he’d rebalance lopsided relations with his returning US counterpart by abruptly rejecting two previously agreed military flights for repatriating his country’s illegal immigrants but was ultimately taught an unforgettable lesson. Trump reacted with fury by threatening 25% tariffs that would double in a week’s time and sanctioning high-level officials on national security pretexts among other punitive measures, which quickly prompted Petro to capitulate.

    White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt then confirmed her country’s victory in its brief dispute with Colombia, shortly after which Petro rage-tweeted a convoluted rant about imperialism and racism as a parting shot against Trump that was widely met with mockery online, especially from Americans. This short-lived scandal was significant since Trump proved how serious he is about leveraging tariffs and sanctions to coerce Ibero-American countries into accepting the return of their repatriated citizens.

    He won the 2016 election in part because of his pledge to build a southern border wall for stopping illegal immigration, but after an estimated 8 million illegals flooded into the country during Biden’s term, he then promised to expel as many as possible if voters returned him to office like they ultimately did. It’ll be difficult to return all of them, however, which is why his administration wants to coerce them into voluntarily leaving on their own by creating extremely onerous conditions for those who remain.

    To that end, repatriating some of them to their homelands on military flights – including in handcuffs like what just happened to some illegal immigrants from Brazil – is meant to intimidate them into returning back home on their own terms, ergo the importance of ensuring that these flights aren’t rejected. In parallel with this, the Trump Administration is exploring an agreement to deport asylum seekers to El Salvador, which is now globally known for its zero-tolerance of gang members.

    On the topic, US-sanctioned Venezuela halted repatriation flights last February after briefly allowing their resumption in October 2023, so suspected Venezuelan gang members might be sent straight from the US to Salvadoran prisons if a deal is reached. Combined with an unprecedented ramping up of ICE raids across the country, those who remain in the US illegally will always have to look over their shoulder and fear either being deported back to their homelands or sent to El Salvador depending on who they are.

    The Trump Administration rightly considers illegal immigration to be a national security threat, which explains Trump’s harsh reaction to Petro rejecting those two previously agreed military flights. If he didn’t make an example out of him, then most Ibero-American countries would predictably defy the US on this issue as well, thus ruining his ambitious repatriation plans. Trump therefore had to remind Colombia and every other country in the hemisphere that they’re the US’ junior partner.

    Failure to submit to its reasonable demands that they receive their repatriated citizens who illegally immigrated to the US will entail crushing tariff and sanctions consequences that’ll risk harming their economies and greatly inconveniencing their political elite. Furthermore, disrespecting the US and Trump personally like Petro did is absolutely unacceptable in what Trump described as the nascent “Golden Age of America”, and those that do so will be made to pay the price, including reputationally.

    The so-called “rules-based order” was never what the Biden Administration mispresented it as being with regard to the claim of every country supposedly being equal and having to follow the same rules. It was always about maintaining the US’ declining unipolar hegemony in the emerging Multipolar World Order by reinforcing the post-Old Cold War international hierarchy atop which it sits. A carrot-and-stick approach pairs with explicit double standards to coax countries into falling in line with varying success.

    Those that are dependent on the US market and/or military equipment like most Ibero-American countries are tend to bend to its will while those like Russia that are more autarkic and strategically autonomous tend to resist. The Obama and Biden Administrations tried to disguise this reality with lofty rhetoric and by sometimes turning a blind eye to transgressions from its partners like those Ibero-American countries that hitherto refused to accept their repatriated citizens, but Trump is more direct.

    He has no compunction about openly reminding them of their junior status vis-à-vis the US since he’d rather that his country be feared than loved if he has to choose between them per Machiavelli. Additionally, Trump is preparing for negotiations with Putin over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence. These imperatives made him escalate with Colombia.

    The example that Trump just made out of Petro will therefore reverberate across the world. What he calls the “Golden Age of America” can more accurately be called the era of US hyper-realism in foreign affairs whereby it explicitly declares its interests and then aggressively pursues them without any care for global opinion. Thus, it might be better for Russia and China to compromise with the US instead of challenge it if they won’t replicate this policy, or if they lack the same power or will to use it.

  • Analyzing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis

    Analyzing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis

    MOSCOW – Russia’s draft military agreement with the Congo coupled with its close security cooperation with Rwanda in the Central African Republic are responsible for its impressively balanced position.

    Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia shared his country’s response to the latest Congolese Crisis during the emergency UNSC briefing on Sunday that followed the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern city of Goma. The roots of this long-running conflict are complex but boil down to security dilemmas, resource, and ethnic reasons that readers can learn more about upon reviewing the following three background briefings:

    • 8 November 202: “A Quick Recap Of The Latest Congolese Conflict”
    • 9 November 2022: “Investigating The French Factor In The Latest Phase Of The Congolese Conflict”
    • 29 May 2024: “Congo’s Polish Spy Scandal Is Worth Paying Attention To After The Recent Failed Coup Attempt”

    In short, Rwanda accuses the DRC of backing the majority-Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR and tied to the 1994 genocide), while the DRC accuses Rwanda of backing the majority-Tutsi M23 as part of a power play over its eastern regions’ minerals. These resources are thought to be at the heart of this conflict, which is driven by (partially externally exacerbated) differences between DRC-residing Hutus and Tutsis, the latter of which are considered by some locals to not be indigenous.

    Nebenzia began by condemning M23’s offensive, which has displaced 400,000 people thus far, and expressing alarm at its use of advanced weapons systems. He elaborated by talking about “the use of heavy artillery close to civilian infrastructure” and “the continued use of electronic warfare means, which poses a threat, inter alia, to civilian aviation.” This last point might allude to the shooting down of the plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in 1994 that triggered the infamous genocide.

    He then expressed condolences to the families of those peacekeepers who were killed in the latest fighting and declared Russia’s support for the UN and Southern African Development Community’s peacekeeping operations in the Eastern DRC. Nebenzia’s next move was to call for restoring the Angolan-mediated Rwandan-DRC talks that broke down late last year. He also importantly said that “real progress on the diplomatic track will be feasible not until the State stops its interaction with illegal armed groups.”

    M23 and the FDLR were mentioned by name, after which he added that “when it comes to the parameters of this process, it is for Rwanda and the DRC to decide whether these parameters are to be defined within the relaunched Nairobi process or within other initiatives. In any case, it is clear that this issue requires a comprehensive approach and certain flexibility by both sides.” This shows that Russia recognizes the security dilemma roots of the latest Congolese Crisis and their associated ethnic ones.

    He then moved along to addressing the resource ones by reminding everyone of how “We must also not forget that the central element of the crisis is the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources… It is also well known that there are other groups and external ‘players’ involved in this criminal business. We all know very well who they are, and we know that they line their pockets by smuggling ‘bloody’ natural resources from the east of the DRC.” This hints at a Western role in exacerbating tensions.

    It also leaves open the possibility that the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 might be acting as Western proxies to seize the DRC’s minerals, though the Russian Foreign Ministry’s call for a ceasefire the day later instead of that group’s unilateral withdrawal suggest that Moscow isn’t yet convinced. The same goes for RT’s decision to interview Vincent Karega, the former Rwandan Ambassador to the DRC who’s now ambassador-at-large in the Great Lakes Region, and then promote it on their front page on Tuesday.

    Karega predictably repeated Kigali’s position that the DRC’s alleged marginalization of its Tutsi minority and failure to implement previous agreements for integrating M23 into the national army are responsible for the latest Congolese Crisis. As could have been expected, he also denied reports that several thousand Rwandan troops have invaded the DRC to help M23 with its offensive. The importance of interviewing him and then promoting it is that it shows Russia’s balanced position towards the crisis.

    Accordingly, while observers can read between the lines of Nebenzia’s briefing to intuit that Moscow blames the M23 for the violence and suspects that there might be a Western trace, it’s premature to claim that Russia is against Rwanda. After all, a superficial comparison of the Congolese and Ukrainian Crises suggests that M23 and Rwanda are playing similar roles as the Donbass militia and Russia, and Eastern DRC has lots of mineral wealth just like Donbass has plenty of lithium wealth in particular.

    Important differences still exist though to make the aforesaid an imperfect comparison. For example, Rwanda was a close US ally during the Congo Wars but fell out of favor in recent years due to its growing ties with China and Russia as well as M23’s rebellion, while Russia never played any such role as Rwanda did in advancing the US’ regional agenda. Moreover, the DRC’s minerals are already being extracted, while Donbass’ lithium has yet to be. Another difference is the nature of their special operations.

    Russia’s officially acknowledged one has gone to great lengths to avoid harming civilians whereas Rwanda’s reportedly ongoing on that it still officially denies has already been devastating for them. Furthermore, there were credible reasons in the run-up to Russia’s special operation for Moscow to suspect that the West was pushing Ukraine to launch an offensive against the Russians in Donbass, while no similar such trigger event apparently existed with regard to Rwanda and the Eastern DRC’s Tutsis.

    In any case, the similarities are close enough that Russia might have felt uncomfortable laying the entire blame on M23 and their reported Rwandan patrons in spite of its draft military agreement with the DRC from last March. Russia might also envisage mediating between them given its close security ties with Rwanda in the Central African Republic. Of course, its position might change depending on whether the conflict expands and the ways in which this might happen, but for now it’s impressively balanced.

  • Korybko To VOA China: 2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

    Korybko To VOA China: 2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

    Here’s the full interview that I gave to VOA China’s FM Shakil on this subject, excerpts of which were published in their report on 20 January titled “安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系”

    Sino-Pak ties officially remain excellent, but they appear to have been placed under a lot of strain over the past year. Pakistan’s inability to protect Chinese workers reflects poorly on its role in hosting the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    Where CPEC goes, so goes BRI, or so the perception is among some who consider this megaproject to be a bellwether of this global infrastructure network’s success. It’s little wonder then that China is concerned about its long-term viability.

    The latest terrorist attacks in Pakistan are thought to be connected to Afghanistan due to reports that the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) and “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA) are operating out of that country with the tacit approval of the Afghan Taliban (simply the “Taliban”).

    Some believe that the Taliban is using terrorist-designated groups as a means of asymmetrically compensating for their conventional military weakness vis-a-vis their former Pakistani patron with whom they’re feuding over the Durand Line, the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and what later became Pakistan, which the Taliban doesn’t recognize.

    Regardless of their possible motivation in speculatively resorting to such means to balance Pakistan’s power, the fact of the matter is that these groups are creating a dangerous environment for CPEC, especially the BLA, which sometimes directly targets associated projects and Chinese workers.

    The problem from China’s perspective is therefore two-fold: the Taliban is allegedly employing terrorist proxies against Pakistan, which is already troubling enough, but Pakistan is unable to adequately protect CPEC projects and Chinese workers, which is arguably due to its misplaced priority of cracking down on former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s PTI opposition party.

    Both of these are outside of China’s direct ability to influence as has been seen. Its prior diplomacy in these regards hasn’t succeeded in getting Afghanistan to eschew such scandalous means for balancing Pakistan’s power, Pakistan continues prioritizing its crackdown on the opposition over its anti-terrorist interests, and ties between these neighboring Chinese-friendly countries continue to deteriorate as proven by the latest tit-for-tat border violence.

    If Afghan-Pak relations keep worsening, then China might consider informally curtailing investment into CPEC and possibly even freezing existing projects, including on unrelated pretexts if that happens and its representatives are pressed to publicly account for this in order to avoid the perception that it’s pulling back from BRI’s flagship project.

    To add a twist to everything, Donald Trump’s return to the American Presidency might see him possibly provide some form of assistance to Pakistan’s latest anti-terrorist campaign, but on the condition that it pulls back from CPEC (also even if only informally) and provides the US with privileged investment and other opportunities to balance Chinese influence in the country.

    His first term was characterized by his economic-driven transactional style so the precedent exists, though he might not ultimately propose such a deal, or it could also include the unacceptable condition of Pakistan curtailing its long-range ballistic missile program against which the former Biden Administration just imposed sanctions, including unprecedented ones against a state agency.

    In any case, 2025 might be a difficult year for Sino-Pak relations due to Pakistan’s worsening domestic security situation caused by Afghan-based terrorists (especially the BLA) and Trump’s plans to more muscularly contain China, the latter of which could see him trying to apply more pressure on CPEC in order to discredit BRI as a whole (if the aforesaid upsurge in terrorism doesn’t do so first).

    Excerpts from this interview were published in VOA China’s report on 20 January titled “安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系”

  • Sikorski Fears That Musk Might Try To Stop Polish Liberals From Capturing The Presidency

    Sikorski Fears That Musk Might Try To Stop Polish Liberals From Capturing The Presidency

    • They can accordingly either try to stop this through scandalous legal moves that risk a national crisis, which could even ruin Poland’s relations with the US, or they can let everything unfold however it will.

    Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski echoed French President Emmanuel Macron’s concerns that Elon Musk’s social media campaigns in support of the AfD opposition in Germany and against incumbent British Prime Minister Keir Starmer amount to meddling. He also called for Poland to pass new laws “so that it is the Polish people who choose our president, not foreigners”, which is ironic considering his friendship with George Soros’ son and heir Alex, whose father has meddled in Europe for decades.

    It was assessed late last month that “Orban Hopes That Trump Will Help Polish Conservatives Return To Power”, ergo why he granted asylum to an opposition figure who alleged that he was being politically persecuted. In connection with that, readers were reminded shortly after Trump’s historic electoral victory that “Top Polish Politicians’ Irresponsible Past Statements About Trump Imperil Bilateral Ties” after Sikorski and his boss Donald Tusk’s rude remarks about the returning American leader resurfaced.

    Trump is close friends with outgoing Polish President Andrzej Duda, who’s a fellow conservative-nationalist that’s stayed in touch with him over the years, so it follows that he’d prefer for his party’s candidate Karol Nawrocki to succeed him as opposed to the liberal-globalist Rafal Trzaskowski. To that end, it’s predictable that Musk might try to stop the ruling liberals from capturing the presidency during May’s election, which could take the form of replicating his existing campaigns but with a Polish touch.

    This might lead to him passionately advocating for the Law & Justice (PiS) opposition in parallel with haranguing against Tusk, Sikorski, and Trzaskowski. PiS’ role as one of the most pro-American parties in European history could be emphasized as could the ruling “Civic Platform’s” (PO) “wokeness” with regard to LGBT. Likewise, Musk might ignore PiS’ visas-for-bribes scandal that brought a quarter-million Africans and Asians to Europe the same as he might ignore PO’s robust border security policy.

    The precedent created by Romania annulling the first round of its presidential election last month on the pretext that foreign social media support for the frontrunner discredited the results, which was later revealed to have actually been a botched campaign by his own opponents, could be applied to Poland too. The difference between Romania and Poland, however, is that the first’s constitutional coup had the Biden Administration’s backing while Trump definitely won’t back that same scenario in the second.

    About that possibility, it was reported last month that Tusk’s government “will propose that, for next year’s Polish presidential election in May, the certification of the result should be handled by the labour law chamber of the Supreme Court and not, as ordained by existing electoral law, the supervisory chamber of the same court.” The larger context behind this proposal concerns Tusk and the EU’s long-running claims that PiS politicized the Supreme Court during its near-decade in power.

    The aforementioned report elaborated that “The Polish Government, along with the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, have argued that the supervisory chamber was improperly constituted as its members were appointed by PiS ally President Andrzej Duda on recommendation of the National Judicial Council (KRS).” It’s beyond the scope of the present analysis to dive deeper into the details of this dispute but it’s enough for casual observers to simply be aware of it.

    The significance is that Tusk’s government might unilaterally implement this proposal, subsequently annul the results of the first round if Nawrocki wins, reject any ruling against this by the Supreme Court or the allegedly “PiS-dominated Constitutional Tribunal”, and rely instead on the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to legitimize their constitutional coup. Any pushback from the Trump Administration could thus provoke a very serious political crisis with both Poland but also the EU.

    If Trump decides to cross the Rubicon in this respect, then he could either threaten punishing tariffs against the EU as a whole, hint at targeted sanctions against Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists, and/or flirt with drastically curtailing the US’ military presence in Poland and possibly freezing major arms deals. The last-mentioned option is the most radical since it risks ruining the anti-Russian basis upon which the Polish-US Strategic Partnership is built but could still be employed to provoke nationalist protests.

    Therein lies the other trick up Trump’s sleeve since he could task Musk with pulling a page from Soros’ playbook by using X to incite large-scale protests for maximally pressuring the ruling liberal-globalists at what would by then be another pivotal moment in Poland’s history. Moreover, the footage of any violent crackdown against these peaceful protesters could then virally circulate on X to incite even more protests, which could be paired with sanctions against those officials who are responsible for this.

    Tusk would therefore do well to read the writing on the wall and let May’s vote play out however it will, accepting that it’s impossible to completely eliminate foreign influence in contemporary elections due to social media and not daring to exploit that as the pretext for annulling the vote if Nawrocki wins. It’s better to maintain the status quo of a conservative-nationalist in the presidency and liberal-globalists running parliament than to risk a national crisis that could also ruin relations with the US.

    The only reason why Tusk wants Trzaskowski to capture the presidency is so that PiS no longer opposes PO’s plans to radically change Polish society. The worst that would thus happen if Nawrocki wins is that Tusk isn’t able to fully implement his legislative agenda, thus perpetuating the political stalemate of the past year till the next parliamentary elections in 2027, unless they’re called earlier. Trump will still be in office by then, however, so Musk might also “meddle” in that vote too with a wink and a nod from him.

    In any case, as was just written, social media enables foreign figures and governments to influence elections in other countries. There’s no way to completely eliminate this factor either since the proliferation of VPNs neutralizes potential bans, ergo the importance of prioritizing “Pre-Bunking, Media Literacy, & Democratic Security” instead as argued in the preceding hyperlinked analysis from 2022. These are much more effective means since they aim to inoculate citizens from foreign influences.

    Wrapping everything up, Sikorski’s comments about Musk’s social media campaigns in Germany and the UK suggest that Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists are panicking since they fear that he’ll soon turn his attention to their country in order to stop them from capturing the presidency during May’s election. They can accordingly either try to stop this through scandalous legal moves that risk a national crisis, which could even ruin Poland’s relations with the US, or they can let everything unfold however it will.