A lawyer representing Nnamdi Kanu, Christopher Chidera, has accused the Supreme Court of committing six fundamental legal errors in its December 2023 decision ordering the continuation of the terrorism trial involving the convicted leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).
Chidera made the allegations in an open letter addressed to the Nigerian Bar Association and dated August 26, 2026.
He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision had left unresolved the legal status of the charges after the Court of Appeal discharged Kanu and quashed the charges in October 2022.
According to him, although the Supreme Court subsequently set aside the Court of Appeal judgment, it ordered the “continuation” rather than a retrial, creating what he described as a critical jurisdictional gap.
“The Supreme Court did not say ‘retrial.’ It said ‘continuation.’ That distinction matters,” Chidera wrote.
He questioned the legal mechanism by which the quashed charges were restored, asking: “What law converted quashed into alive?”
Chidera also challenged the Supreme Court’s description of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 as “extant and existing law” in its December 15, 2023 judgment.
He argued that the legislation had been repealed by the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 and cited Section 122 of the Evidence Act, which requires courts to take judicial notice of laws previously and currently in force.
The lawyer said the issue raised questions about which law kept the proceedings alive following the repeal of the 2013 Act, pointing to Section 97 of the 2022 legislation as requiring examination.
He further challenged the Supreme Court’s treatment of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, arguing that the court acknowledged the Charter as part of Nigerian law but failed to address its implications for the circumstances under which Kanu was brought back to Nigeria.
Chidera cited the Supreme Court’s reliance on Abacha v Fawehinmi, including its statement that Nigerian courts must give effect to the domesticated African Charter.
“The African Charter cannot be treated as binding law when being quoted and as decorative language when being applied,” he said.
A major part of the lawyer’s argument concerns the Supreme Court’s findings on Kanu’s rendition from Kenya to Nigeria.
Chidera cited Justice Emmanuel Agim’s findings describing Kanu’s seizure and transfer as unlawful, including references to “brazen lawlessness” and an “unfair and oppressive” prosecution.
He argued that those findings should have had consequences for the continuation of the criminal proceedings.
Chidera also questioned the application of the principle established in Madukolu v Nkemdilim, particularly the requirement that proceedings come before a court through due process of law.
He juxtaposed that principle with the Supreme Court’s findings concerning Kanu’s rendition and cited Justice Lawal Garba’s statement that “not even this court can confer jurisdiction where none exists.”
“If the Supreme Court itself cannot confer jurisdiction, then the Federal High Court cannot acquire it from the Supreme Court,” Chidera argued.
He further questioned the application of Section 76(1)(d)(iii) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 to alleged conduct occurring outside Nigeria, particularly broadcasts attributed to Kanu while he was abroad.
According to him, the provision creates statutory requirements for exercising jurisdiction over certain offences committed outside Nigeria, including whether the conduct constitutes an offence under the law of the country where it occurred.
Chidera urged the Nigerian Bar Association, the International Bar Association and members of the legal profession to examine the issues he raised.
“Show us the law that restored the quashed counts,” he demanded.
He said the central issue was not the seriousness of the allegations against Kanu but whether the prosecution and subsequent conviction were founded on a valid legal basis.
“The more serious the allegation, the more important the law becomes,” he wrote.
Chidera added that the Supreme Court’s use of the word “continuation” did not, in itself, resolve the jurisdictional questions raised by the earlier discharge and quashing of the charges.
“Until that question is answered, the word ‘continuation’ is not a legal bridge. It is merely a word placed over a jurisdictional gap,” he said.
(The Whistler)
