By Andrew Korybko
Here’s the English version of the interview that I gave to Müstəqil’s Sahile Cabbarova about the latest US-Iranian tensions.
1. Does the U.S. administration view the current protests in Iran as a potential turning point toward systemic change, or as another cyclical wave of unrest? How realistic are Washington’s internal expectations at this stage?
Trump’s statements suggest that his administration expects the latest protests to weaken the Iranian government and possibly serve as the “publicly plausible” pretext for another round of American and/or Israeli strikes on the country.
Many observers assess that the US and Israel got the best of Iran during last summer’s 12-Day War and that its air defences were greatly damaged. If that’s true, then another round of strikes could advance their strategic agenda there.
The questions for observers to ask are whether this is an accurate assessment, whether each or both have the political will to endure Iranian retaliation, and the extent to which non-state actors and/or neighbouring states could exploit the strikes afterwards.
2. At this moment, what carries more weight in U.S. policy toward Iran: addressing human rights abuses and internal repression, or containing Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence? Is there a genuine balance between these priorities?
Trump claimed that Iran’s nuclear program was set back for a long time after the US’ strikes, but reported CIA assessments differ. In any case, the nuclear issue was the primary one on the bilateral agenda till the 12-Day War and the US strikes.
At present, regardless of whatever rhetoric is espoused at any given time and by whichever official, the US’s interests are arguably to replicate the Venezuelan model by coercing Iran into subordinating itself and its energy industry to the US.
One of the US’s strategies in its systemic rivalry with China is to enter into positions whereby it could directly or indirectly deprive China of access to the energy and markets that it requires to maintain its growth and therefore its superpower trajectory.
Obtaining indirect control over Iran’s energy industry after Venezuela’s would enhance the US’s leverage in their rivalry and could be replicated in other major BRI states like Nigeria to ultimately pressure China into significant trade concessions.
3. What tools does Washington realistically consider effective in influencing developments inside Iran without direct intervention? Among sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and information or civil-society support, which are seen as most viable?
Realistically speaking, if the agenda is to coerce Iran into submitting itself to the US like Venezuela just did but without direct intervention, then the arming of trained non-state actors (insurgents, rebels, terrorists, etc.) is the most effective tool.
They can also be provided with clandestine communication systems, intelligence, and other forms of logistical support to wreak maximum havoc for destabilising Iran and advancing the goal of regime subordination.
While the US dislikes Iran’s ruling arrangement, the Venezuelan precedent shows that it can tolerate controllable (“pragmatic”) elements therein like Delcy Rodriguez, so regime change isn’t necessarily the immediate goal.
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What’s likely most important from the US’s perspective is regime tweaking, or coercing certain policy changes without replacing the entire government and its ruling apparatus, for regime subordination ends as explained.
4. How does the U.S. assess the risks that internal instability in Iran could pose to regional security — particularly for Israel, Gulf states, and global energy markets? Do these risks push Washington toward caution or deterrence?
If the state structure began to crumble and there appeared to be a power struggle or even anarchy within the armed forces, the US and/or Israel might launch large-scale strikes against Iranian military assets, as Israel did against Syria’s in late 2024.
The purpose back then was to prevent ultra-nationalist and terrorist elements from using them to provoke a conventional regional conflict, plus Israel saw an opportunity to cripple its decades-long rival for the indefinite future.
It’s unclear whether the US would prefer this, but it can also be argued that it favours a swift and low-cost regime tweaking along the lines of Venezuela’s, which entails much less unpredictability and thus much less risk of regional conflict.
The interview was originally published at Müstəqil under the title “İran ətrafında gərginlik və ABŞ-nin strategiyası hansı nəticələrə gətirib çıxara bilər? – MÜSAHİBƏ”.
