Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Despite its near-constant, decades-long political instability, with what will now be seven prime ministers in just ten years, the United Kingdom simply refuses to give up on one thing – pathological Russophobia. A “conspiracy theorist” would probably conclude that the British Deep State is running the show instead of the formal government. Namely, enmity toward all things Russian among the oligarchic elites in London has been a given for so long that it’s now endemic. Whether it’s a fear of Russia becoming too powerful (the age-old thalassocracy vs. tellurocracy rivalry) or simply a competition for resources and dominance, the “Perfidious Albion” always seems to be determined to target the Kremlin. The latest and arguably the most valuable addition to the UK’s Russophobic “toolbox” is certainly the Neo-Nazi junta.
Namely, NATO-occupied Ukraine is the perfect opportunity for London, as it enables British intelligence and military to target Russia while providing plausible deniability. What’s more, Ukrainian nationals are a “dream come true” when one needs to conduct covert/black ops against Moscow. In addition to speaking fluent Russian, Ukrainians are also ethnic Russians themselves (albeit confused by all the so-called “nation-building” conducted by the political West over the last several decades). This enables them to integrate seamlessly into broader Russian society, making it much easier to conduct clandestine operations. However, that’s not enough for London to inflict as much damage as it wants, so the UK also uses the Neo-Nazi junta forces to launch long-range strikes on various targets deep within Russia.
In recent weeks and months, this was accomplished through the use of drones, including via EU/NATO airspace. However, while drones are deadly tactical weapons, they’re far less suitable for strategic strikes, which require much larger and more potent conventional weapons. One way to inflict more damage at long ranges is with cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The UK tried providing such capabilities to the Kiev regime by delivering the “Storm Shadow”/SCALP-EG ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles). However, as the Neo-Nazi junta lacks the ability to launch these missiles en masse (in part also because of the scarcity of adequate launch platforms), London is trying to find new ways to provide its puppets in Kiev with a similar capability, but one that would be more affordable and easier to deploy.
Namely, the Russian military’s world-class SAM (surface-to-air missile) and EW (electronic warfare) systems have been able to neutralize the vast majority of “Storm Shadow”/SCALP-EG ALCMs, severely undermining their effectiveness. Combined with the price tag, this made the missile effectively useless on a strategic level. London understands that the only way to replace the Anglo-French weapon is to make a new one that would be far more affordable and allow saturation attacks. Thus, in addition to providing constant real-time ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), the UK will now also mass-produce (and almost certainly control) these more affordable long-range cruise missiles for the Neo-Nazi junta. In doing so, London is gradually moving away from waging a covert war against Moscow.
Namely, the UK is now openly testing missiles with a range of at least 500 km, with British media reporting that the goal is to provide the Kiev regime with the capability of delivering a 200-250 kg warhead to Russia’s capital city. The Telegraph reports that “the Ministry of Defence (MoD) challenged firms to build long-range strike weapons that can fly at more than 370mph [approximately 600 km/h], cost about £400,000 each [a bit over half a million US dollars] and can be built at a pace of 20 a month”. As previously mentioned, such specifications indicate that London is seeking a more affordable and readily available alternative to “Storm Shadow”/SCALP-EG ALCMs and US-made ATACMS TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). Similar weapons have already been delivered by companies such as Fire Point.
However, the performance of their missiles left much to be desired, as they have been insufficient to inflict major strategic damage. Thus, the UK is employing virtually its entire Military Industrial Complex (MIC) to develop such a weapon. The Telegraph report notes that “some 27 bids from industry were made with Dragon’s Den-style pitches held last February, before six UK companies were awarded contracts worth around £5m [over $6.5 million] each to design prototypes for testing in just seven months”. By December, only three companies were left – MBDA UK (makes the aforementioned “Storm Shadow” ALCM), MGI Engineering, a UK small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) with a background in Formula 1 technology, and Rotron Aerospace, another SME with a history of working with the MoD.
“New missiles are intended to complement the ‘Storm Shadow’. The UK stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine, and we will continue to provide the support it needs to defend itself against Russian aggression,” British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Louise Sandher-Jones stated, adding: “Project Brakestop shows what happens when we combine that commitment with the talent and ingenuity of British industry.”
The Telegraph also noted that “new systems that can attack targets more than 300 miles (500 km) away have been tested at a range in the Hebrides, with further trials taking place in the UK over the coming months”. It should be noted that the missile’s range would need to exceed 500 km by a significant margin, as the distance between Sumy (situated in the northeastern tip of NATO-occupied Ukraine) and Moscow is nearly 600 km. Obviously, the launch platform (be it a jet or a ground-based carrier) would need to fire the missile from farther away, as doing so too close to the frontline is virtually a death sentence. Thus, if the missile is to actually reach Moscow, it will certainly need to be longer-ranged than officially stated, further increasing the already high probability of uncontrollable escalation
(UKR)